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INTRODUCTION 
 Armed with a gun, Petitioner Benjamin Arriaga angrily confronted 
Benacio Herrera about claims that Herrera had slept with Arriaga’s estranged 
wife. The confrontation ended when Arriaga shot Herrera five times. Arriaga 
pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for the dismissal of two second-degree 
felonies.  
 At the change-of-plea hearing, Arriaga stated that he and his attorney 
discussed the content of the plea affidavit. He represented that he understood 
everything they talked about. Arriaga also acknowledged that he understood 
the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, the nature and elements of the 
crime of murder, and the consequences of his plea. When asked if he had any 
-2- 
questions, Arriaga responded that he did not.  
 But when trial counsel provided a factual basis for the murder charge, 
Arriaga stated that he defended himself and that he never intended to hurt 
the Herrera. Trial counsel then interjected that he explained to Arriaga the 
concept of imperfect self-defense in relation to the facts of Arriaga’s case. In 
addition, the trial court asked Arriaga if he knew pulling the trigger on the 
gun would cause Herrera’s death. Arriaga acknowledged that he did. The 
court accepted Arriaga’s guilty plea and sentenced him to fifteen years to life 
in prison.  
 In a post-conviction petition filed months later, Arriaga alleged gener-
ally that his plea was invalid because he did not understand the nature of the 
murder charge and the consequences of his plea. He also claimed that he 
received ineffective representation because his trial attorney did not have a 
Spanish-language interpreter present for their out-of-court discussions, 
which allegedly caused Arriaga to misunderstand his counsel’s plea advice. 
The State moved for summary judgment. 
  The district court—and, ultimately, the Utah Court of Appeals—
rejected Arriaga’s claims. And for good reason. Most of Arriaga’s allegations 
were contradicted by the acknowledgements he made at the change-of-plea 
hearing. The court of appeals correctly held that Arriaga was bound by those 
-3- 
representations absent a valid reason why they should not be believed, which 
Arriaga never provided. In addition, while Arriaga belatedly alleged that he 
was never told what the implications of a defense of imperfect self-defense 
would be at a trial, or that the absence of such a defense was an essential 
element of the murder charge, his attorney explained that they had discussed 
this issue. The court of appeals correctly held that the trial court was entitled 
to rely on counsel’s explanation in finding Arriaga’s guilty plea knowing and 
voluntary.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 This Court granted Arriaga’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review 
the following question: 
 “Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the post-conviction 
court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief.”  
 Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews for correctness the 
decision of the court of appeals. See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶15, 144 P.3d 
1096. Because the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision 
granting the State’s summary judgment motion, the correctness of the court 
of appeals’ decision turns, in part, on whether the court of appeals accurately 
reviewed the district court’s ruling under the standard of review applicable 
to motions for summary judgment. Id. Under rule 56, Utah Rule of Civil 
-4- 
Procedure, the facts and any reasonable inferences must be viewed “in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶6, 
177 P.3d 600 (citations omitted). Correctness “also turns on whether [the court 
of appeals] correctly assessed preservation of the issues before it.” Baumann 
v. Kroger Co., 2017 UT 80, ¶15, 416 P.3d 512.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts.1 
 After repeatedly lying to police that he had any involvement in the 
death of Benacio Herrera, R631, 638-40, 642, 662-66, 668-74, 676, Petitioner 
Benjamin Arriaga eventually admitted that, armed with a handgun, he 
angrily confronted Herrera in an open field about claims that Herrera had 
slept with Arriaga’s estranged wife. R605, 632-33, 665, 670, 675, 680-82. 
Herrera denied the affair, which made Arriaga even angrier. R633, 681, 685. 
Arriaga told Herrera to tell the truth or he would kill him.2 R694-95. Arriaga 
pulled the gun from his waistband to get Herrera to admit to the affair. R633, 
643, 682, 695. Herrera begged for forgiveness, but Arriaga said it was not the 
kind of thing that could be forgiven. R694. According to Arriaga, Herrera 
                                              
1The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript, attached 
as Addendum B, and the transcript of Arriaga’s police interview, attached as 
Addendum C. 
2Arriaga also told the police that he “was not going to do it.” R695.  
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then lunged at him and a struggle ensured. R633, 643, 682, 685, 694. Arriaga 
shot Herrera five times, once in the abdomen, once in the leg, twice in the 
small of the back, and once in the back of the head. R607.  
 After the murder, Arriaga disposed of the gun by selling it to a man on 
the street. R633, 686-87. Someone walking through the field found the body 
and reported it to police. R614. No weapons were found on Herrera. R616. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
 The State charged Arriaga with murder, a first-degree felony. R237-38. 
He was also charged with possession or use of a firearm by a restricted 
person, and obstructing justice, both second-degree felonies. Id.  
Change-of-Plea Proceedings3 
 Arriaga pleaded guilty to murder and the other charges were dis-
missed. R80, 85, 410. At the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court explained 
through an interpreter that Arriaga had the right to the presumption of inno-
cence, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a speedy and public 
trial before an impartial jury, the right to call and cross-examine witnesses, 
the right to a unanimous verdict on all the elements of the crimes beyond a 
                                              
3 The Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment Transcript (change-of-
plea hearing) is attached as Addendum D. The Statement of Defendant in 
Support of Guilty Plea (plea affidavit) is attached as Addendum E.  
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reasonable doubt, and the right to appeal. R408-20. Arriaga acknowledged 
that he understood he would be waiving these rights by pleading guilty. 
R411. The court also explained the maximum and minimum penalty for 
murder, which Arriaga acknowledged he understood. R412.  
 The court asked defense counsel whether he believed Arriaga was 
competent to plead and understood his rights. R412. Counsel responded 
affirmatively and explained that he and Arriaga had been working together 
on the case for over a year—including the preliminary hearing and a motion 
to suppress Arriaga’s statements to the police. Id. Arriaga acknowledged that 
he was satisfied with counsel’s assistance and that he fully understood 
everything counsel talked to him about. Id.   
 Arriaga also acknowledged that he and his attorney had been through 
the plea affidavit together. R412-13. In the affidavit, Arriaga certified that he 
read the plea affidavit, understood its contents, understood the nature and 
elements of the crime of murder, the consequences of his guilty plea, and the 
rights he would be waiving. R82-84, 86. He also certified that he was satisfied 
with the advice and assistance of his attorney. R86.  
 When the trial court asked for a factual basis, trial counsel stated that 
Arriaga “confronted a man who had been sleeping with his wife. An 
argument and subsequent fight took place at which time he pulled out a 
-7- 
firearm and he shot the man killing him.” R413. Through the interpreter, the 
court asked Arriaga if that was what happened and Arriaga said, “I defended 
myself. It was not my intention. I never thought about hurting him.” Id. The 
court asked if Arriaga’s response changed the plea. Id. Counsel explained, 
“Your Honor, we had—we had discussed the imperfect self-defense concept 
and that he did pull out a gun to get the man to confess to his sleeping with 
his wife. And that the man charged at him but he was unarmed. So that is 
why he used a gun.” Id.   
 When the court accepted the factual basis, Arriaga said, “He was 
drugged and drunk and I didn’t know if he had a weapon, a knife and that’s 
why I.…” Id. At this point, the prosecutor stated that the plea would be valid 
only if Arriaga admitted that he intentionally—or knowingly—caused 
Herrera’s death. R414. Trial counsel interjected that Arriaga “is prepared to 
say, your Honor, he’s asked that I say it, that by pulling the trigger he knew 
that it would cause the death of the man.” Id. The trial court then directly 
asked Arriaga, “do you understand that by pulling the trigger you knew you 
could cause the death of the gentleman?” Id. Arriaga responded, “Yes.” Id.  
 After ensuring that Arriaga had not been forced or coerced into plead-
ing guilty, the court told him, “If you feel like you understand what you’re 
doing and you want to do this today, I will have you go ahead and sign that 
-8- 
plea form.” R415. Arriaga signed the plea affidavit and the court accepted his 
guilty plea to murder. R87, 415.  
Post-Conviction Proceedings4 
 Arriaga timely filed a pro se post-conviction petition. R1. He asserted 
that his attorney was ineffective, his plea was invalid, and that Herrera’s 
death was an accident and therefore unintentional. R13-17. After counsel was 
appointed, he filed an amended petition alleging that he received ineffective 
representation and that his plea was invalid. R65-75. He argued that counsel 
was ineffective for not having a Spanish-language interpreter present during 
their out-of-court discussions about the case, which he alleged resulted in him 
not understanding the rights he was waiving. R70-71. In particular, he argued 
that he did not understand that he could take his case to trial and assert a 
defense that he did not have the requisite intent for murder. R71. Arriaga 
argued that this made his plea unknowing and involuntary. R70-71. The State 
filed a response to Arriaga’s amended petition, arguing that relief should be 
denied because he had failed to prove his claims. R105-05, 111-27.  
 After appointed counsel moved to withdraw from the case, Arriaga 
filed a pro se reply to the State’s response. R306-313. There he stated that trial 
                                              
4 The district court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attach-
ed as Addendum F.  
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counsel’s ineffectiveness denied him the chance to present evidence of “his 
lack of intent to commit murder.” R307. He argued that there was a fight, he 
pulled his gun out to scare Herrera but Herrera charged him, “and he 
instinctively pulled the trigger but not intending to kill the victim.” R307-08; 
see also R311 (“Petitioner is not sure exactly how the gun was discharged, but 
he is certain he did not intend to kill the victim.”). According to Arriaga, it 
was his lack of the requisite mental state that he was trying to convey to the 
court when he stated during the plea colloquy that he was defending himself 
and never thought about hurting Herrera. R311-13.  
 The district court eventually appointed new counsel and convened an 
evidentiary hearing. R325, 443-44. But when the State objected to post-
conviction counsel’s questioning of trial counsel on issues not raised in the 
amended petition, the court ended the hearing and allowed Arriaga to file 
another amended petition to raise additional claims. R534-550. In the second 
amended petition, Arriaga raised three claims. First, he argued that he 
received ineffective representation when counsel allegedly did not properly 
communicate with him, did not investigate the case, and did not pursue 
available defenses. R446-50, 1114-19. Second, without specificity, he alleged 
that his “conviction was obtained by a plea of guilty that was unlawfully 
induced or not made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
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charge and the consequences of the plea.” R450. Last, he asserted that he was 
denied his right to appeal. R450.   
 The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that Arriaga’s 
proffer failed as a matter of law to establish his claims. R819-62. Arriaga 
opposed the motion. R1095-1121. For the first time, he alleged that his plea 
was invalid on the theory that he did not understand the interplay between 
the essential elements of a first-degree murder charge and a second-degree 
manslaughter charge based on imperfect self-defense. R1108-09, 1111. After 
hearing oral argument from the parties, the district court granted the State’s  
summary judgment motion. R1219-21.  
 The district court ruled that Arriaga failed to show that his attorney 
was ineffective. R1269. The court concluded that Arriaga had not established 
that he should not be bound by the representations he made at the change-
of-plea hearing. Id. Because Arriaga acknowledged that he understood every-
thing his attorney told him and the consequences of pleading guilty, he had 
not shown that his counsel performed deficiently for not having a Spanish-
language interpreter present during their private conversations about the 
plea. Id. And even if counsel had performed unreasonably, Arriaga failed to 
show that he was prejudiced. Id. The court also ruled that because all of the 
constitutional prerequisites for a knowing and voluntary plea were satisfied, 
-11- 
the plea was valid. R1269-70. But nowhere did the court address or rule on 
Arriaga’s theory that the guilty plea was invalid because he had an incom-
plete understanding of the murder charge, or was never informed of the 
implications of a defense of imperfect self-defense at trial. The district court 
therefore denied Arriaga’s post-conviction petition. R1270.  
Proceedings on Appeal 
 Arriaga timely appealed. R1289-90. He argued that his guilty plea was 
invalid because it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. See Arriaga v. 
State, 2018 UT App 160, ¶7, 436 P.3d 222. He asserted that the self-defense 
statements he made during the plea colloquy “negated an essential element 
of the murder charge.” Id. at ¶13. His statements, Arriaga argued, were objec-
tive evidence that he misunderstood the elements of the crime he was plead-
ing guilty to and showed that he lacked an understanding of the proceedings. 
Id. at ¶¶12-13. He also argued that his plea was not knowing because he 
allegedly did not understand English and never read the plea affidavit. Id. at 
¶15. The court of appeals rejected Arriaga’s arguments. Id. at ¶¶12-13, 15.  
 The court held that any potential misunderstanding was inconse-
quential in light of Arriaga’s acknowledgements at the change-of-plea 
hearing. Id. at ¶12. In the plea affidavit—which was written in English and 
Spanish—the elements of the murder charge were explained and a factual 
-12- 
basis provided. Id. Arriaga assured the trial court that he had reviewed the 
plea affidavit and understood its contents. Id. Thus, there was “no doubt that 
[Arriaga] understood the elements of the murder charge at the time of his 
guilty plea.” Id.  
 In addition, when Arriaga made his self-defense statements, trial 
counsel assured the trial court that he had explained to Arriaga the concept 
of imperfect self-defense in relation to the facts of the case. Id. at ¶13. And 
because Arriaga had already told the trial court that he understood every-
thing counsel explained to him, the court of appeals held that it was reason-
able for the trial court to rely on counsel’s assurances that Arriaga understood 
how imperfect self-defense applied in his case. Id. (citing Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 
545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005)). Nevertheless, the court of appeals recognized that 
when Arriaga made his self-defense statements and said it was not his 
intention to harm Herrera, the trial court had a duty to “to address the conflict 
between this statement and the plea affidavit.” Id. at ¶14. The majority deter-
mined that the trial court fulfilled its responsibility by asking Arriaga 
whether he knew his action in pulling the trigger of the gun would cause 
Herrera’s death, to which Arriaga said he did. Id.  
 Arriaga also argued that his plea was invalid because he could not 
understand English and he never read the plea affidavit. Id. at ¶15. But the 
-13- 
court of appeals pointed out that these claims contradicted the represen-
tations Arriaga made to the trial court at the change-of-plea hearing that he 
did read the plea affidavit and understood everything his trial attorney told 
him. Id. The court of appeals held that Arriaga was bound by his represen-
tations absent a valid reason why they should not be believed, which Arriaga 
never provided. Id. (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977)).  
 Finally, Arriaga argued that he received ineffective representation 
because trial counsel did not have an interpreter present during their private 
conversations about the case. Id. at ¶16. But again, the court of appeals noted 
that Arriaga acknowledged during the plea colloquy—when an interpreter 
was present—that he understood everything that counsel had explained to 
him. Id. at ¶18. “Had there been an insurmountable language barrier, 
[Arriaga] had the opportunity to raise this with the court,” but never did. Id.  
 In any event, the court of appeals held that Arriaga had failed to show 
prejudice. Id. at ¶19. Based on the factual circumstances surrounding the 
plea—including Arriaga’s confession, the denial of his motion to suppress the 
confession, the fact that the victim was shot five times, including twice in the 
back and once in the back of the head, and the questionable applicability of a 
defense of imperfect self-defense—the court of appeals held that it was 
rational for Arriaga to accept the State’s plea offer. Id. at ¶20.  
-14- 
 In a concurring opinion, Judge Pohlman agreed with the lead opinion 
with a single exception. Id. at ¶22. In her view, it was “questionable whether 
the [trial] court’s attempts to resolve the conflict” between Arriaga’s self-
defense claims and his acknowledgements in the plea affidavit “were 
successful.” Id. Nevertheless, she concurred in the result because she agreed 
that Arriaga failed to show prejudice. Id. at ¶25.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Arriaga challenges the court of appeals’ decision affirming the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and dismissing his 
post-conviction petition.  
 Point I. Arriaga initially alleged—without particularity—that his 
guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. But after the State 
filed its summary judgment motion, Arriaga claimed in his opposition 
memorandum that his plea was invalid because he was never informed that 
the absence of imperfect self-defense is an essential element of murder. But it 
is well-established that a party may not add new claims in a memorandum 
opposing summary judgment. Because Arriaga waited until his opposition to 
summary judgment to raise this specific invalid guilty plea argument, he 
never properly presented it to the district court for consideration. And the 
district court neither considered nor ruled on that version of Arriaga’s invalid 
-15- 
guilty plea claim. It was therefore never properly preserved for appellate 
review.  
 Point II. In any event, Arriaga’s guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary. The record of the change-of-plea hearing shows that all of the 
constitutional prerequisites for a knowing and voluntary plea were satisfied. 
And Arriaga has not affirmatively shown that his plea was unknowing or 
involuntary. He argues that because he stated he defended himself, but no 
one explained to him the implications of an imperfect self-defense claim, that 
he did not have a meaningful understanding of the murder charge. But the 
absence of imperfect self-defense is not an element of murder at the plea-
taking stage.  
 In addition, trial counsel assured the trial court that he discussed 
imperfect self-defense with Arriaga, and Arriaga never objected to counsel’s 
assurance. The presumption is that counsel provided Arriaga with an ade-
quate explanation of imperfect self-defense. The trial court was entitled to 
rely on counsel’s assurance. Arriaga also claims that his plea is invalid 
because he did not read the plea affidavit and did understand what his 
attorney told him. But these allegations are contradicted by Arriaga’s 
acknowledgements at the change-of-plea hearing. Arriaga is bound by those 
acknowledgements.  
-16- 
 Point III. Arriaga argues that his attorney was ineffective for not 
having a Spanish-language interpreter present during their private conver-
sations. He alleges that he therefore misunderstood counsel’s advice about 
the guilty plea. But the record contradicts Arriaga’s claim. When the trial 
court asked him through an interpreter if he understood everything trial 
counsel talked to him about, Arriaga said he did. Arriaga is bound by his 
statement.  
 In any event, counsel met with Arriaga in private on multiple occasions 
and Arriaga never complained that he was unable to understand what 
counsel said. He told the trial court that he understood everything counsel 
told him. The strong presumption is that counsel made a reasonable decision 
that Arriaga’s command of the English language was sufficient for him to 
adequately comprehend the substance of their discussions without the aid of 
an interpreter.  
 And even if counsel was deficient in this respect, Arriaga cannot show 
prejudice. First, on the facts of his case, Arriaga has not shown that, but for 
counsel’s alleged deficiency, it would have been rational for him to insist on 
going to trial instead of pleading guilty. Second, he alleges that he believed 
counsel told him that he had already been found guilty, that if he won at trial, 
he would still go to prison, and that he had no choice but to plead guilty. But 
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all of these alleged misunderstandings were cured at the change-of-plea 
hearing. Yet, Arriaga still pleaded guilty. In other words, any deficiency on 
trial counsel’s part did not affect Arriaga’s decision to plead guilty.  
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Arriaga’s claim that his self-defense statements negated 
an element of his guilty plea to murder is unpreserved 
because it was raised for the first time in his opposition to 
the State’s summary judgment motion and was never con-
sidered by the district court. 
 
 In “order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented 
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule 
on that issue.” Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶14, 48 
P.3d 968. “Additionally, a party that makes an objection based on one ground 
does not preserve any alternative grounds for objection for appeal.” Oseguera 
v. State, 2014 UT 31, ¶10, 332 P.3d 963.  
 In his second amended petition, Arriaga never raised the claim that his 
plea was invalid because his self-defense statements negated an essential 
element of the murder charge or that no one explained to him the implica-
tions of a defense of imperfect self-defense at trial. R446-50, 1108-12; see also 
Pet’s Brief at 13-18. Rather, he argued that his plea was not knowing and 
voluntary because he did not understand that he was innocent until proven 
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guilty, “that he did not have to plead guilty,” and that “winning at trial would 
mean no prison time.” R448. The closest he came to alleging the invalid guilty 
plea claim he now raises on appeal was when he stated that his self-defense 
claim shows he did not agree that he committed murder. R448. But Arriaga 
never predicated his claim on the theory that no one ensured that he under-
stood that, as an element of the crime of murder, the State would have to 
disprove the existence of imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
or that a successful imperfect self-defense claim at trial would defeat the 
murder charge and result in a manslaughter conviction.  
 Arriaga first raised this theory in his opposition to the State’s summary 
judgment motion. R1108-12. But it is well-settled that a “plaintiff cannot 
amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a 
memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment 
because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah’s pleading requirements.” 
Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, ¶31, 48 P.3d 895; see also Hudgens v. 
Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68, ¶20 n.19, 243 P.3d 1275 (same). In other words, a 
specific claim for relief raised for the first time in an opposition memorandum 
is procedurally improper and, by definition, is an argument not raised in a 
manner that allows a court to consider it. Appellate courts will decline to 
address such an issue “as it was never properly raised below.” Id.  
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 Because Arriaga waited until his opposition to summary judgment to 
raise his alternative invalid guilty plea argument, he never properly present-
ed it to the district court for consideration. And, in fact, the district court 
neither considered nor ruled on it. R1262-70. The court only ruled on the 
invalid guilty plea claim Arriaga pleaded in his second amended petition. 
R1269-70. Thus, Arriaga never properly preserved his invalid guilty plea 
claim predicated on the trial court’s alleged failure to ensure that he under-
stood the implications of his self-defense claim or that the absence of 
imperfect self-defense was an element of the murder charge. See Gowe v. 
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App 105, ¶9 n.2, 356 P.3d 683 
(“Presentation of one argument or theory to the district court does not 
preserve for appeal any alternative arguments, even regarding the same 
issue.”).  
II. 
The court of appeals correctly affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment on Arriaga’s invalid guilty 
plea claim because all the constitutional prerequisites for 
a knowing and voluntary plea were met and Arriaga has 
not shown otherwise. 
 
 In any event, the court of appeals correctly determined that Arriaga 
failed to show that his guilty plea was invalid. To show that his plea was 
invalid, Arriaga must establish that it was entered in violation of either the 
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state or federal constitutions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1)(a); see also 
Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 n.6 (Utah 1993) (on 
“collateral attack of a conviction, the petitioner must show a constitutional 
violation to obtain relief”). That is, he must demonstrate that his guilty plea 
was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. “A plea is not knowing and 
voluntary when the defendant ‘does not understand the nature of the 
constitutional protections that he is waiving, or because he has such an 
incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an 
intelligent admission of guilt.’” State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶29, 279 P.3d 
371 (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976)).   
 And to obtain post-conviction relief, Arriaga must also show prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(2) (“The court may not grant relief from a 
conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes that there would be a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved 
in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence and facts 
introduced at trial or during sentencing.”). To do so, Arriaga “must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that such 
a decision would have been rational under the circumstances.” Ramirez-Gil v. 
State, 2014 UT App 122, ¶8, 327 P.3d 1228 (citations and internal quotation 
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marks omitted); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
A. All the constitutional prerequisites for a valid guilty plea were 
satisfied.  
 
 A constitutionally valid guilty plea is “one that has a factual basis for 
the plea and ensures that the defendant understands and waives his 
constitutional right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the 
right to confront witnesses.” Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, ¶20, 203 P.3d 976; 
see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (“A defendant who 
enters … a [guilty] plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, 
including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to 
trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers.”). “To have a complete 
understanding of the charge … a defendant must possess ‘an understanding 
of the law in relation to the facts.’” Alexander, 2012 UT 27 at ¶29 (citations 
omitted); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (“[B]ecause a 
guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it 
cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding 
of the law in relation to the facts.”). “In determining whether a defendant 
understands the law in relation to the facts, courts review whether the 
defendant understood the ‘critical’ or ‘essential’ elements of the crime to 
which he pled guilty.” Id. at ¶30. 
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 Here, all the constitutional prerequisites for a valid guilty plea were 
met. Among others, Arriaga’s rights against self-incrimination, to a speedy 
and public trial before an impartial jury, and to confront witness were 
explained to him in the plea affidavit. R81-84. Arriaga acknowledged that he 
understood these rights and that he would be waiving them by pleading 
guilty. R84. In addition, the trial court explained these rights to Arriaga and 
informed him that he would be giving them up if he pleaded guilty. R411. 
Arriaga acknowledged that he understood this. R411.  
 Arriaga also had an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.  
First, the plea affidavit explained—and Arriaga acknowledged that he 
understood—that the elements of murder were that he intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of another. R81, 86. Although Arriaga stated that 
he defended himself and did not intend to harm Herrera, he agreed that he 
knew that pulling the trigger of the gun would cause Herrera’s death. R413-
14. He therefore acknowledged that he knowingly killed Herrera.  
 Second, a factual basis for the plea was set forth in the plea affidavit. 
R81. In addition, trial counsel explained at the change-of-plea hearing that on 
April 4, 2010, Arriaga confronted Herrera, who had been sleeping with 
Arriaga’s wife, that an argument and fight ensued, and that Arriaga pulled 
out a gun and shot Herrera, killing him. R413. The plea affidavit’s and the 
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trial court’s explanations of the elements of the crime and the factual basis 
counsel provided gave Arriaga an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts by informing him that he was guilty of murder because (1) he knowingly 
(2) caused the death of another. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a) 
(“Criminal homicide constitutes murder if … the actor intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another.”).  Accordingly, all the requirements 
for a constitutionally valid guilty plea were met in Arriaga’s case. 
B. The court of appeals correctly determined that Arriaga failed 
to show that his guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary. 
 
 Arriaga nevertheless argues that his guilty plea was not valid. See Pet’s 
Brief at 12-33. As explained, for a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary, a 
defendant must have an adequate understanding of the essential elements of 
the crime he is pleading guilty to. See Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶30. Arriaga 
argues that, because he asserted that he defended himself, the State’s burden 
to disprove his self-defense claim became an essential element of the murder 
charge. See Pet’s Brief at 13, 16-18. But, he contends, no one ever informed 
him that the absence of imperfect self-defense was an element of the murder 
charge, that the State would have to disprove imperfect self-defense if the 
case went to trial, or that a successful imperfect self-defense claim would 
defeat the murder charge at trial and result in a manslaughter conviction. Id. 
This failure, Arriaga argues, shows that he did not have an adequate 
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understanding of the essential elements of the murder charge. Id. at 13, 18. 
He therefore contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. 
Id. at 18. Arriaga is mistaken.  
 First, Arriaga’s central premise is incorrect. The elements of murder—
which Arriaga acknowledged he understood—are that he intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of another. R81, 414; see also Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203(2)(a) (“Criminal homicide constitutes murder if … the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another.”). “Absence of self-
defense is not an element of a homicide offense. As a matter of statutory 
construction, § 76-5-201 does not make absence of self-defense a prima facie 
element of a homicide crime. Rather, self-defense is a justification for a killing 
and a ‘defense to prosecution.’” State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985) 
(citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-401 and -402) (emphasis in original); but see 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶45, 192 P.3d 867 (in trial context a “necessary 
element of a murder conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses”). Thus, 
merely because the trial court did not ask Arriaga “if he understood the 
implications of his self-defense assertions,” Pet’s Brief at 17, does not mean 
that he did not have an adequate understanding of the elements of the 
murder charge. And by specifically admitting that when he pulled the trigger 
on the gun he knew he would cause Herrera’s death, Arriaga did understand 
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the elements of the murder charge. R414.  
 Second, even assuming that the absence of self-defense is an element 
of the murder charge, Arriaga’s guilty plea was still knowing and voluntary. 
When Arriaga asserted, “I defended myself. It was not my intention. I never 
thought about hurting him,” counsel immediately assured the trial court—
without objection from Arriaga—that he had discussed imperfect self-
defense with him. R413. The presumption is that counsel provided an 
adequate explanation of imperfect self-defense, including that the State bore 
the burden of proving the absence of self-defense at a trial, and that if an 
imperfect self-defense claim were successfully asserted, a murder conviction 
would be reduced to a manslaughter conviction. See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (stating a “court must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (“When 
collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of 
regularity.”), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 
(1981)); Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, ¶24, 125 P.3d 917 (“In a proceeding 
where a defendant seeks to collaterally attack a court’s judgment, we 
presume the regularity of the proceedings below.”); Price v. Turner, 502 P.2d 
121, 122 (Utah 1972) (“After one has been convicted of [a] crime the 
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presumption of innocence and other protections afforded an accused no 
longer obtain. The presumptions then are in favor of the propriety of the 
proceedings….”). 
 In finding that Arriaga’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, the 
trial court was entitled to rely on counsel’s assurances that imperfect self-
defense was explained to Arriaga. The United States Supreme Court has held 
that, while the “court taking a defendant’s plea is responsible for ensuring ‘a 
record adequate for any review that may be later sought,’ we have never held 
that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the 
defendant on the record.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (quoting 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969)). “Rather, the constitutional 
prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately 
reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were 
explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel.” Id.  
 Where a “defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court 
usually may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant has been 
properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is 
pleading guilty.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 
637, 647 (1976) (“Normally the record contains either an explanation of the 
charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that 
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the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even 
without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume 
that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense 
in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to 
admit.”); Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (court considering challenge to guilty plea 
“is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the 
petitioner received from his or her attorneys before entering the plea”).  
 Thus, because Arriaga acknowledged that he understood everything 
counsel talked to him about and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s 
assistance, R86, 412, the trial court was entitled to rely on counsel’s assurances 
that he explained imperfect self-defense to Arriaga. Arriaga has therefore not 
shown that the trial court failed to ensure that he understood the implications 
of his self-defense claim, or that the district court erred in concluding that 
Arriaga’s plea was knowing and voluntary.  
 Arriaga also asserts that the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea 
show that it was not knowing and voluntary. See Pet’s Brief at 18-20. Specifi-
cally, he argues that because he did not speak English, his trial counsel did 
not speak Spanish, and no Spanish-language interpreter was present during 
their private conversations, he did not fully understand counsel’s advice. Id. 
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at 19. He alleges, for example, that he believed counsel told him he had 
already been found guilty, there was no need for a trial, if he won at trial he 
would still go to prison, and he had no choice but to plead guilty. Id. He also 
asserts that he did not understand that he was innocent until proven guilty. 
Id. And he alleges that his misunderstandings were compounded by the fact 
that he did not read the plea affidavit and at the change-of-plea hearing he 
was still operating under what he understood from trial counsel. Id. at 20. 
Because he “completely misunderstood the nature of his guilty plea” the 
district court erred in ruling that it was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
Id. Again, Arriaga is mistaken. 
 The court of appeals correctly concluded that Arriaga’s guilty plea was 
knowing and voluntary because any misunderstandings were cured at the 
change-of-plea hearing. First, while Arriaga states that he never read the plea 
affidavit, id., his claim is directly contradicted by the signed plea affidavit 
itself. There Arriaga specifically acknowledged that he either read the plea 
affidavit or had it read to him by his attorney, he and his attorney fully 
discussed its contents, he understood everything they talked about, and he 
understood—and adopted as his own—all the statements in the plea 
affidavit. R82, 86, 412-13.   
 It is well-settled that “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a 
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strong presumption of verity” that create a “formidable barrier in any 
subsequent collateral proceedings.”  Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 
(1977); see also United States v. Scalzo, 764 F.3d 739, 746 (7th Cir. 2014) (“But 
having admitted the facts in the Information through his plea agreement and 
through his answers to the court during his change-of-plea colloquy, 
[defendant] may not now deny them.”); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 191 
(4th Cir. 2000) (absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 
defendants are bound their representation when pleading guilty); Ramos v. 
Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 1999) (a “defendant must be bound to the 
answers he provides during a plea colloquy. Allowing petitioner to withdraw 
his plea would essentially put this court in the position of … condoning the 
practice by defendants of providing untruthful responses to questions during 
plea colloquies. This we simply will not do.”); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 
1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1995) (defendant is bound by his answers during the plea 
colloquy); Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. 2012) (“A 
defendant is bound by the statements made during the plea colloquy, and a 
defendant may not later offer reasons for withdrawing the plea that 
contradict statements made when he pled.”).  
 Other than his bare assertion, nothing in the record suggests that the 
representations in Arriaga’s plea affidavit and his answers to questions asked 
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by the trial court during the plea colloquy were anything other than truthful 
and voluntary. See Burket, 208 F.3d at 191(defendant bound by representa-
tions where he “presented no evidence of sufficient evidentiary force, e.g., 
evidence that he was forced, coerced, threatened, or improperly induced into 
pleading guilty to demonstrate that his representations were untruthful or 
involuntary.”). “But when a party takes a clear position in a [statement], … 
he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which 
contradicts his [statement], unless he can provide an explanation of the 
discrepancy.” Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983); see also 
Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998)  (“An affidavit, as a 
matter of law, cannot contradict [a] prior sworn statement … which was clear 
and unequivocal, [unless] the affidavit [ ] state[s] an adequate reason for the 
contradiction.”). “A contrary rule would undermine the utility of summary 
judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of fact.” Id. at 1173.  
 Thus, Arriaga’s affidavit contradicting the acknowledgements he 
made when he pleaded guilty is insufficient to create a genuine factual 
dispute. R486-87. Indeed, if all it took to collaterally challenge a guilty plea is 
to simply contradict what the record firmly establishes—particularly a 
petitioner’s own statements—then virtually all guilty pleas would be subject 
to collateral attack when a petitioner avers that he did not mean what he said 
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at the change-of-plea hearing. See United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221-
11 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary dismissal of collateral attack on guilty 
plea where defendant’s allegations merely contradicted his sworn statements 
during his plea colloquy). Accordingly, Arriaga is bound by his plea affidavit 
and change-of-plea hearing representations absent “an adequate reason for 
the contradiction,” which he has not provided. Brinton, 973 P.2d at 973.  
 Second, regardless of whether Arriaga misunderstood his counsel’s 
advice, the trial court’s plea colloquy and the plea affidavit remedied any 
misunderstandings Arriaga may have had about the consequences of his 
plea. See Ramirez-Gil, 2014 UT App 122, ¶10 (holding correct statements in 
plea affidavit adequately substituted for any insufficient explanations by 
counsel); Rhinehart v. State, 2012 UT App 322, ¶8, 290 P.3d 921 (mis-
understanding from counsel’s advice “was cured at the plea hearing when 
Rhinehart repeatedly acknowledged under oath that she understood the 
consequences of her plea.”); Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(“[T]he state trial court’s proper colloquy can be said to have cured any 
misunderstanding [defendant] may have had about the consequences of his 
plea.”). Arriaga acknowledged that he understood that he was “presumed 
innocent until the State prove[d] that [he was] guilty of the charged crime.” 
R83, 411. He understood that he did not have to plead guilty if that was not 
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what he wanted to do. He specifically acknowledged in the plea affidavit, “If 
I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead ‘not guilty,’ and 
my case will be set for a trial.” R83. In addition, Arriaga acknowledged that 
no one was forcing him or threatening him to plead guilty. R86, 414. Thus, 
Arriaga knew that he did not have to plead guilty if that was not what he 
wanted to do. 
 Arriaga also knew that winning at trial meant no prison time. The plea 
affidavit informed him that a guilty verdict involved a finding that he 
committed a crime, a not guilty verdict meant he did not commit a crime, and 
punishment resulted from being found guilty, not from being found not 
guilty. R83-84. In addition, at the time Arriaga pleaded guilty he was not a 
novice to the criminal justice system and had been through the plea process 
before. R1047-60. In 2003 he was charged with several class A and class B 
misdemeanors. R1047-48. He ultimately pleaded guilty to simple assault, a 
class B misdemeanor, and the rest of the charges were dismissed. R1047-48, 
1053. Arriaga knew when he was sentenced that he was being punished only 
for the crime for which he was guilty and not the offenses that were 
dismissed. R1053. Then in 2004, he was charged with several third-degree 
felonies and a class A misdemeanor. R1056. Based on a plea agreement with 
the State, he pleaded guilty to three third-degree felonies. R1056, 1059-60. 
-33- 
Again, Arriaga was aware at that time that he was only sentenced for the 
crimes he was guilty of and not the offenses that were dismissed.   
 Having been charged with criminal offenses on two prior occasions 
and punished only for the offenses he pleaded guilty to, Arriaga was 
necessarily aware that if he were found not guilty at a trial he would not be 
punished. Thus, based on his acknowledgements in the plea affidavit and his 
prior experience in the criminal justice system, Arriaga understood when he 
pleaded guilty that winning at trial would mean no prison time. 
* * * * * 
 In sum, all of the prerequisites for a constitutionally valid guilty plea 
were satisfied in Arriaga’s case and he has not shown otherwise. The trial 
court was entitled to rely on counsel’s assurance that he discussed imperfect 
self-defense with Arriaga. And regardless of whether Arriaga misunderstood 
his counsel’s advice, any misunderstanding was cured by the trial court and 
the plea affidavit. Accordingly, the court of appeals correctly determined that 
Arriaga’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.  
III. 
The court of appeals correctly held that Arriaga’s trial 
counsel was not ineffective during the plea process.  
 
 Arriaga argues that the district court erred when it denied his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for not having a Spanish-language inter-
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preter present when they discussed the guilty plea. See Pet’s Brief at 34-35. 
He asserts that because no interpreter was present, he believed his trial 
counsel told him that there was no need for a trial because he had already 
been found guilty; that even if he prevailed at a trial, he would still go to 
prison; and that he had to plead guilty that day. Id. at 36. He also alleges that 
he did not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was 
innocent until proven guilty. Id. According to Arriaga, but for counsel’s 
errors, he would have rejected the state’s plea offer and insisted on going to 
trial. Id. at 32-33, 41.  
 A petitioner who pleads guilty has an especially high burden in 
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. The “plea process brings to the 
criminal justice system a stability and a certainty that must not be under-
mined by the prospect of collateral challenges in cases … where witnesses 
and evidence were not presented in the first place.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 
115, 132 (2011). Thus, as a petitioner claiming counsel ineffectiveness in the 
context of a guilty plea, Arriaga has a “substantial burden … to avoid the 
plea.” Id. To succeed, Arriaga must “show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient” and that the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A failure to establish either 
Strickland element defeats Arriaga’s claim. See id. at 687, 697. Here, the court 
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of appeals correctly determined that Arriaga failed to establish either 
deficient performance or prejudice. Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶¶18-20.   
A. Arriaga has not shown that trial counsel’s decision not to have 
a Spanish-language interpreter present during their private 
discussions was unreasonable. 
 
 To prove deficient performance Arriaga must show that counsel’s 
actions “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688. Because of the “difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a 
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689; see also id. at 
687 (counsel “is strongly presumed to have … made all significant decisions 
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”). This standard is 
appropriately deferential, recognizing that “[u]nlike a later reviewing court, 
the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside 
the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with 
the judge.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). And deference to 
counsel’s decisions is “all the more essential when reviewing the choices an 
attorney made at the plea bargain stage.” Premo, 562 U.S. at 125. Here, Arriaga 
has not shown that counsel performed deficiently. 
 Arriaga’s claim that he could not understand what his attorney told 
him during their private discussions is contradicted by the record. R1265-66. 
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Arriaga acknowledged that he met with counsel for a few minutes at each of 
the fourteen hearings in his case. R13, 722-31. They also met together “for 
approximately an hour at the jail prior to trial.” R13. And, as trial counsel 
explained to the trial court at the change-of-plea hearing, he and Arriaga had 
been working together for over a year and Arriaga had assisted him in 
preparing for the preliminary hearing and filing a motion to suppress. R412.  
 With respect to all of these private meetings, Arriaga never complained 
to counsel or the trial court that he could not adequately understand what 
was being discussed. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that trial counsel and 
Arriaga could discuss the case at the jail for an hour if Arriaga was truly 
unable to adequately communicate. This “failure to complain earlier about a 
problem that would have been obvious to [Arriaga]—an almost complete 
inability to communicate with his lawyer—calls into question whether such 
a problem really existed.” Gallo-Vasquez v. United States, 402 F.3d 793, 799 n.1 
(7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the reasonableness of “[c]ounsel’s actions are 
usually based, quite properly, on … information supplied by the defendant.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. In light of the strong presumption that counsel 
“made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment,” without any indication from Arriaga that he was not adequately 
understanding what counsel was saying, trial counsel could reasonably 
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conclude that a Spanish-language interpreter was not necessary during their 
private conversations.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 689.  
 In addition, as explained, the contents of the plea affidavit and the trial 
court’s questioning during the plea colloquy also contradict Arriaga’s claims 
that he misunderstood counsel’s advice on the presumption of innocence, 
whether he would still be punished if he were acquitted, and whether he 
could insist on going to trial. Arriaga acknowledged that he read the plea 
affidavit or had it read to him. R86. He acknowledged that he and his attorney 
fully discussed the contents of the plea affidavit, his rights, and the conse-
quences of his guilty plea. R82, 412-13. This included a discussion of the 
presumption of innocence, that if Arriaga wanted to go to trial, all he had to 
do was plead “not guilty,” and that he would be punished only if he pleaded 
guilty. R82-83. Arriaga further acknowledged that he understood everything 
in the plea affidavit, he understood everything his trial counsel talked with 
him about, and he was satisfied with his counsel’s advice and assistance. R86, 
412. Arriaga’s record acknowledgements establish that he was capable of 
adequately communicating—and in fact did adequately communicate—with 
trial counsel during their private meetings.  
 Arriaga suggests, however, that he should not be held to his 
acknowledgements because he never actually read the plea affidavit and at 
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the time he pleaded guilty was operating under what he understood from his 
discussions with counsel. See Pet’s Brief at 36. But again, as explained, it is 
well-settled that “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong 
presumption of verity” that create a “formidable barrier in any subsequent 
collateral proceedings.” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. Other than his bare 
assertion otherwise, R487, Arriaga has never proffered any evidence showing 
that the representations he made in his signed plea affidavit and his answers 
to questions asked by the trial court were anything other than truthful and 
voluntary. Accordingly, his contradictory statements are insufficient to create 
a genuine factual dispute. Arriaga’s acknowledgements establish that he 
adequately understood counsel during their private discussions. The court of 
appeals therefore correctly held that Arriaga failed to show “that trial counsel 
acted unreasonably in failing to secure an interpreter for his out-of-court 
consultations” with Arriaga. Arriaga, 2018 UT App 160, ¶18.  
B. Arriaga fails to show prejudice because he has not established 
the rationality of rejecting the State’s plea offer and insisting 
on going to trial, and because he pleaded guilty even after 
receiving full and accurate information from the trial court. 
 
 Even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently for not having 
a Spanish-language interpreter present during their private discussions, 
Arriaga cannot show that he was prejudiced. To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice 
element in the context of a guilty plea challenge, Arriaga “must show that 
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there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that such 
a decision would have been rational under the circumstances.” Ramirez-Gil, 
2014 UT App 122, ¶8 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372; Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  In “evaluating the likelihood and 
rationality of a decision to reject a plea bargain and go to trial,” courts “‘look 
to the factual circumstances surrounding the plea.’” Rippey v. State, 2014 UT 
App 240, ¶14, 337 P.3d 1071 (quoting Ramirez-Gil, 2014 UT App 122 at ¶8). 
 Because this is an objective standard, a petitioner’s “mere allegation 
that he would have insisted on trial but for his counsel’s errors … is ulti-
mately insufficient to entitle him to relief.” United States v. Clingman, 288 F.3d 
1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Collazo-Collazo v. State, 2015 UT App 111, ¶10, 349 P.3d 776 (same). Rather, 
Arriaga “must come forward with objective evidence that he would not have 
pled guilty.” Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2010); see 
also Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 (petitioner alleged no “special circumstances” to 
support contention that he placed particular emphasis on counsel’s incorrect 
advice); Segura v. State, 749 N.E. 2d 496, 507 (Ind. 2001) (“[S]pecific facts, in 
addition to the petitioner’s conclusory allegation, must establish an objective 
reasonable probability that competent representation would have caused the 
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petitioner not to enter a plea.”).  
 Arriaga argues that his post-conviction affidavit and his self-defense 
statements establish a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Pet’s Brief at 32. According 
to Arriaga, Herrera lunged at him before he shot the gun and therefore he 
had an imperfect self-defense claim. Id. at 41. But the facts of the case show 
that it was Herrera—not Arriaga—who was trying to defend himself when 
he allegedly lunged at Arriaga. Arriaga therefore did not have a viable 
imperfect self-defense claim that he could raise at trial.  
  s explained, in his statements to police, Arriaga repeatedly lied about 
having any involvement in Herrera’s death. R631, 638-40, 642, 662-66, 668-74, 
676. He ultimately admitted, however, that, armed with a gun, he angrily 
confronted Herrera in an open field about claims that Herrera had slept with 
Arriaga’s estranged wife. R605, 632-33, 665, 670, 675, 680-82. Herrera denied 
the affair, which made Arriaga even angrier. R633, 681, 685. Arriaga told 
Herrera to tell the truth or he would kill him. R694-95. Arriaga pulled the gun 
from his waistband to get Herrera to admit to the affair. R633, 643, 682, 695. 
At this point, Herrera begged for forgiveness, but Arriaga said it was not the 
kind of thing that could be forgiven. R694. Herrera then lunged at Arriaga. 
R633, 643, 682, 685, 694. Arriaga shot Herrera five times, once in the abdomen, 
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once in the leg, twice in the small of the back, and once in the back of the 
head. R607. After the murder, Arriaga disposed of the gun by selling it to a 
man on the street. R633, 686-87. Someone walking through the field found the 
body and reported it to police. R614. No weapons were found on Herrera. 
R616. 
 These facts do not support an imperfect self-defense claim. Arriaga was 
angry, was armed with a gun, confronted an unarmed Herrera, brandished 
the gun, said he would kill Herrera, and told Herrera there was no 
forgiveness for what he had done. Only at that point did Herrera allegedly 
lunge at Arriaga—arguably to defend himself from being shot by Arriaga. 
Arriaga shot Herrera five times, including twice in the back and once in the 
back of the head. He then sought to cover up his actions by disposing of the 
weapon. No reasonable juror would believe that these “circumstances pro-
vided a legal justification or excuse” for killing Herrera. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203(4). That Herrera tried to defend himself by lunging at Arriaga did 
not undermine the fact that Arriaga had total control over the circumstances 
or that he shot Herrera in the back of the head. Arriaga did not defend 
himself; he executed Herrera. 
 Contrary to Arriaga’s argument, he had no viable imperfect self-
defense claim that would have made rational a choice to reject the State’s plea 
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offer and insist on going to trial. He almost certainly would have been 
convicted, and going to trial would have forfeited the substantial consider-
ation Arriaga received by pleading guilty. The court of appeals therefore 
correctly held that Arriaga had failed to show prejudice. See Arriaga, 2018 UT 
App 160, ¶¶19-20.  
 Arriaga now contends, however, that the court of appeals’ prejudice 
holding was erroneous because the court ignored recent United States 
Supreme Court precedent that, he alleges, changed the prejudice analysis. See 
Pet’s Brief at 39. He argues that under Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 
(2017), the Supreme Court altered the counsel-ineffectiveness prejudice 
standard in the plea-taking context by rejecting “a per se rule that a defendant 
with no viable defense cannot show prejudice.” Pet’s Brief at 30. “Lee held 
that for attorney error that effects [sic] the defendant’s understanding of the 
consequences of his plea—not attorney error that effects [sic] the defendant’s 
prospects of success at trial—a defendant does not have to prove that he 
would have a viable defense at trial.” Id. at 39. Consequently, because trial 
counsel’s error in Arriaga’s case went to his understanding about the plea, he 
has to show only that “whatever he misunderstood was important and 
determinative to him.” Id. at 40. Arriaga is mistaken.  
 In Lee, the Supreme Court reiterated the difficulty in surmounting 
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Strickland’s high bar and that “the strong societal interest in finality has 
‘special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.’” Lee, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1967 (quoting United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979)). The 
Court recognized that a “defendant without any viable defense will be highly 
likely to lose at trial.” Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1966. And where “a defendant has no 
plausible chance of acquittal at trial, it is highly likely that he will accept a 
plea if the Government offers one.” Id.  
 Nevertheless, for some defendants—in particular noncitizen defen-
dants concerned about deportation—there is often “more to consider than 
simply the likelihood of success at trial.” Id.  For these defendants, the “deci-
sion to plead guilty also involves assessing the respective consequences of a 
conviction after trial and by plea. When those consequences are, from the 
defendant’s perspective, similarly dire, even the smallest chance of success at 
trial may look attractive.” Id. For Lee, a noncitizen, the determinative issue 
was deportation, not the length of incarceration he might face if he went to 
trial and lost. Id. at 1968. Because avoiding deportation was of paramount 
importance, losing at trial and spending significantly longer in prison than 
he would spend by accepting the Government’s plea offer was rational for 
Lee. Id.  
 Here, however, Arriaga has not demonstrated that there was more to 
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consider for him—such as deportation—than the length of time he would 
spend in prison for his crimes. Nor has he articulated “the respective 
consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea” that he faced that would 
have changed his decision to plead guilty. He suggests that the “plea was not 
a significantly better deal” because only two second-degree felonies were 
dropped and the first-degree felony—with a fifteen years to life sentence—
remained. Pet’s Brief at 41. Presumably, his argument is that he had nothing 
to lose by going to trial because the sentencing outcome if he lost was not 
much different than the sentencing outcome of his plea.  
 But as the Supreme Court made clear in Lee, courts “should not upset 
a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he 
would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead 
look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed 
preferences.” Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967. Arriaga points to no “contemporaneous 
evidence” suggesting that anything other than reducing his time in prison 
was the important consideration for Arriaga. And that is precisely what he 
achieved by pleading guilty. While his “post hoc assertions” are that the plea 
deal did not significantly reduce the prison time he faced, the facts show 
otherwise. Without the dismissal of the two second-degree felonies, Arriaga 
would run the risk that the trial court would run his sentences consecutively. 
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If so, Arriaga could have potentially served up to fifteen years on each of 
second-degree felony convictions before he even started serving his sentence 
on the murder conviction. Thus, even under Lee, Arriaga has not shown that 
he suffered any prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies.   
 In any event, Arriaga cannot show prejudice for an additional reason. 
Even assuming trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies caused Arriaga to 
misunderstand counsel’s advice, any misunderstanding was cured at the 
change-of-plea hearing—and yet Arriaga still chose to plead guilty. Arriaga 
asserts that because no interpreter was present during their out-of-court 
conversations about the guilty plea, he incorrectly believed his trial counsel 
told him that there was no need for a trial because he had already been found 
guilty; that even if he prevailed at a trial, he would still go to prison; and that 
he had to plead guilty that day. See Pet’s Brief at 36. He also alleges that he 
did not understand that he did not have to plead guilty and that he was 
innocent until proven guilty. Id.  
 But Arriaga acknowledged at the change-of-plea hearing that he 
understood that he was “presumed innocent until the State prove[d] that [he 
was] guilty of the charged crime.” R83, 411. His acknowledgements also 
show that he knew that winning at trial would mean no prison time. The plea 
affidavit informed Arriaga that a guilty verdict involved a finding that he 
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committed a crime, that a not guilty verdict meant he did not commit a crime, 
and that punishment resulted from being found guilty, not from being found 
not guilty. R83-84.  Because Arriaga acknowledged that he understood the 
contents of the plea affidavit, R82, 86, 412-13, he necessarily understood that 
punishment would result only if he were found guilty at trial, not if he were 
found not guilty.   
 In addition, as shown, Arriaga’s prior extensive experience with the 
criminal justice system suggests that he knew that winning at trial would 
mean no prison time. As explained, in his other criminal matters where he 
pleaded guilty, Arriaga was aware that he was only sentenced for the crimes 
he pleaded guilty to, not the crimes that were dismissed as part of the plea 
agreement. R1047-48, 1053, 1056, 1059-60. Based on his prior experience in the 
criminal justice system and his acknowledgements in the plea affidavit, 
Arriaga understood that winning at trial would mean no prison time. 
 Arriaga also knew that he had not yet been found guilty and that he 
did not have to plead guilty if that was not what he wanted to do. Arriaga 
acknowledged in the plea affidavit, “I know that if I do not plead guilty …, I 
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime. If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead ‘not 
guilty,’ and my case will be set for a trial.” R83. In addition, the trial court 
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asked Arriaga to sign the plea affidavit, but only if that was what he wanted 
to do. R415. Thus, Arriaga was aware that if he did not want to plead guilty, 
he did not have to. In other words, any alleged misunderstandings as a result 
of counsel’s alleged deficiencies made no difference to the outcome of the 
proceeding. Accordingly, Arriaga suffered no prejudice.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment of the 
Utah Court of Appeals.  
 Respectfully submitted on April 10, 2019. 
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